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INTRODUCTION
The expenence of the October 1987 Crash has made people realize that a sIgnificant event In a world's major market could have a strong Influence on other markets, especIally on the smaller or emergIng stock markets In the Pacific-BasIn. There IS a general belief among Investors and speculators In iurnal Pengurusan 13 MalaYSIa that the small and thmly traded MalaysIan (KLSE) market IS hIghly mfluenced by the bIg and advanced or developed markets of the us (NYSE) and Japan (TSE) . Many of these people would look at the perfonnance of these bIg markets before decIding on whether or not to enter the local market. Furthennore, if the earlier perfonnance of a market (due to the difference m tIme zone) has a hIghly sIgnificant relatIOnshIp wIth the current perfonnance of another market, then thIS relatIOnshIp can be profitably explOIted. As shown by column 3 (New York tIme) of Table 1 , Tokyo market opens two hours before the opemng of the Kuala Lumpur market. The New York market opens after those ASIan markets are closed, and It closes before the ASIan markets open.
The central theme of thIS paper IS not to prove that the dependence of the KLSE on the developed markets IS due to the "integratIon" of the markets, because thIS will reqUIre: (1) some trading statIstIcs among these markets; (2) the markets are open to mfluence among them; and (3) appropnate tests for causality, such as Granger or Sims tests. The purpose of thIS paper IS to examme the ability of predictmg the begmnmg-of-the-week returns on the emergmg KLSE based on the end-of-the-week perfonnance of the developed markets of Tokyo and New York. If there eXIsts a SIgnificant relatIOnshIp between the end-of-the-week perfonnance of the developed markets (of Tokyo and New York) and the begmnmg-of-the-week perfonnance of the KLSE, then thIS relatIOnshIp can be explOIted profitably In additIOn, the "stability" of the relatIOnshIp IS also Important for any trading rule to succeed. So the central Issues to be mvestIgated are the relatIOnshIp that mIght eXIst between developed markets and the emergmg KLSE, and whether or not the relatIOnshIp IS stable over tIme. Fischer and Palasvirta (1990) used a spectral analysIs of the pnce behavIOr of stock market mdices m 23 countnes to test for mterdependence between the tIme senes of stock market mdices m order to support or reject the hypotheSIS that world markets are becommg more mtegrated. The results mdicated that the level of mterdependence (as shown by the co-movements between markets) grew substantially from 1986 to 1988 due mamly to histoncal trend and less related to factors assocIated wIth the October 1987 crash. The srudy also shows that the U.S. market seems to lead almost every other stock market m the world. Jeon and von Furstenberg (1990) studied the mterrelatIonships among stock pnces m major world stock exchanges (Tokyo, Frankfurt, London and New York), usmg the vector autoregressIOn (v AR) approach to daily stock pnce mdices of those markets for the penod of January 1986 through November 1988. The study showed an eVIdence of a SIgnificant strucrural change m terms of the correlatIOn structure and leadershIp m the major world stock markets smce the stock market crash of October 1987. The results mdicated that dunng the pre-crash penod, stock pnces m eaach market could be explamed well by theIr own recent hIstory and by us stock pnces, WIth the London market the only exceptIOn. But after the crash, stock pnce changes m each market except Tokyo are explamed better by pnce changes m foreIgn markets than by theIr own pnce hIStOry Also, the degree of mternatIOnal comovements m the stock pnce mdices has mcreased SIgnificantly smce the crash. The role of the Immediately preceding market m the determmatIOn of stock pnces was greatly enhanced after the crash. Before the crash of October 1987, the New York market eVIdently led world markets. The strong leadershIp of the us market reduced smce the October crash, espeCIally WIth respect to Japan. The Tokyo market has shown greater mdependence from other major stock markets smce the October crash. Mathur and Subrahmanyam (1990) exammed the mterdependencles among the stock market mdices for four Nordic countnes (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) and the us usmg the concept of Granger causality The vector autoregressIve (v AR) model results mdicated that the us market affected only the Damsh market. The Swedish market was causally pnor to both the NorwegIan and Finmsh markets. The NorwegIan, Damsh, and Finmsh markets did not "Granger cause" any other market. The results also mdicate that the Nordic stock markets are less than fully mtegrated, where full mtegranon refers to sImultaneous adjustment to any new mformatIOn commg mto the market, thereby not provIding opportumnes for abnormal profits assocIated wIth lagged mformanon.
On the Issue of volatility spillover, Ng, Chang and Chou (1991) exammed the transmISSIon of volatility from the us market to four Pacific-Basm trading partners of the us, I.e., Japan, Korea, TaIwan, and Thailand. The study mdicated that while the market fundamentals of these countnes are believed to be closely related to the us market fundamentals, there was no volatility spillover from the us to Korea and Taiwan, the two markets WIth the most severe restnctlOn on cross-country mvesnng. There was also no volatility spillover from the us to Thailand before the opemng of the Alien Board to facilitate the trading of ThaI secunnes by foreIgn mvestors. The volatility spillover from the us to Japan took place mostly after us stocks were allowed to be traded on the Japanese market. The authors concluded that crosscountry mvesnng does play a very Important role m the transmISSIOn of volatility between stock markets. A study by King and Wadhwanl (1989) mdicated that the mcreased volatility after the crash of October 1987 raIsed the covanances of returns among different stock markets. ThIS means that hIgher volatility m one market may lead to the mcreased correlanon between pnce movements m that market and pnce movements m other markets.
None of the studies CIted above exammed the effect of the end-of-theweek performance of major markets on the begmmng-of-the-week performance of other markets. Since MalaysIa IS ahead of the us m terms of nme, the effect of the Fnday's performance of the us market IS not felt m the MalaysIan market until Monday. In addinon, eventhough Japan and MalaysIa are, more or less, m the same nme zone, the effect of the Saturday'S trading on the Japanese market will not be felt on the MalaysIan market until Monday smce there IS no trading on Saturday on the MalaysIan market.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The data base conSIsts of fnday's mdex changes for the us market, saturday's mdex changes for the Japanese market, and monday's mdex changes of the KLSE. The mdices used m these study are the KLSE Industnals (MalaYSIa), Nikkel Dow Jones (Tokyo), and Dow Jones Industnal Average (New York). These mdices were chosen because they are WIdely referred to and consIdered to be representanve of the respecnve markets. The penod of the study IS from January 1983 to December 1990.
Fnday's mdex changes refer to end-of-the-day Fnday returns over Thursday Monday's mdex changes refer to end-of-the-day Monday returns over Friday Arguably, the more appropnate returns are begmmng-of-theday Monday returns over Fnday However, these returns are not used because of the unavailability of the opemng Monday pnce data for the KLSE dunng the penod of the study Furthennore, the effect of the end-of-theweek perfonnance of the developed markets are arguably not supposed to be "fully" reflected "immediately" at the openmg of the trading hour, on Monday, of the emergmg market. With the "inefficIency" of the emergmg market, It IS qmte safe to assume that It will take some orne before the full effect can take place. The questlOn IS when exactly will the effect take place? By takmg the end-of-the-day Monday returns over Fnday, will not totally solve thIS problem. But, our concern IS not finding the exact hour the full effect will take place. Rather, we are mterested m finding out the ability of predictmg the end-of-the-day Monday returns over Fnday of the KLSE based on the end-of-the-week perfonnance of the developed markets.
One can also use daily data to illustrate the relaoonshIp that mIght eXISt. But, from the pracocal pomt of VIew, the frequent trading will eat up any profit that can be benefitted from the relaoonship that mIght eXIst. So, It IS qmte Justifiable to use the weekly data (specifically, the end-of-the-week and the begmnmg-of-the-week data) to illustrate the relaoonship between developed markets and the emergmg market.
First, the mean, vanance and standard deviatlOn were computed for each market to gIve some prelimmary measures regarding the perfonnance and volatility of each market. In additIon, the vanance ratlOs between the developed markets and the emergmg KLSE were computed. Since the mere measurement of the vanance raoos are not qmte adequate m describmg the volatility of one market compared WIth another, a fonnal robust modified Levene test was carned out to detennme the equality of vanance between two markets.
The null hypothesIs that two markets have the same vanance was exammed usmg the Brown- differences.
The F-statistIc above IS distributed Fc_l,n_c under the null hypothesIs.
The standard F-test for varIance equality IS not robust to departures from normality In the data (Layard 1973) . Conover et al. (1981) evaluated more than 50 procedures for testIng the homogeneIty of vanance hypotheSIS and concluded that a Brown-Forsythe (1974) Next, a regressIOn analysIs was performed to determIne whether there IS a SIgnificant linear relatIOnshIp between the Index changes of the KLSE (the dependent variable) and that of the us market and also Japanese market. The DurbIn-Watson test was conducted to detect any autocorrelatIOn In the data.
The correlatIOn coeffiCIents between developed markets and the KLSE for each penod were computed. One word of cautIOn IS warranted here. As pOInted out by Jeon and Furstenberg (1990) , It IS not easy to tell whether strong pOSItIve correlatIOns Imply that markets are Integrated across countnes or rather that markets are segmented and responding to common InternatIOnal shocks. In additIOn, correlatIOn coeffiCIents do not proVIde InformatIon on causal relatIOnshIps between varIables In the model. It will be more appropnate to study what effects a shock or InnOvatIOn In one market will have on others and what the strength and perSIstence of those effects will be.
The null hypothesIs that the correlatIOns are equal between two subpenods was tested USIng the Z-statIstIc (Maldonado & Saunders 1981) Since correlatIOn does not tell the whole story about causal relatIOnshIp, a causality test was conducted. In testIng the causality between two varIables X and Y, a one-way Granger causality test as suggested by Geweke (1984) was used. The test uses the ordinary least squares regressIOn (OLS) WIth the folloWIng specificatIOn:
(1) (1) and ( 
FINDINGS
The volatility, as measured by the standard devIatlon, and the mean of Index changes of each market are shown In Table 2 . For the MalaysIan market, negatlve mean return can be seen In almost all years, wmch means that the average return on Monday IS negatlve. The same can also be Said WIth the entlre penod of [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . On the other hand, the us market showed posItlve mean return for almost all penods, WhICh means that the average return on Fnday IS posItIve. These results are qUite conSIstent WIth the results of the day-of-the-week or weekend effect studies on the MalaYSIan or the US markets (e.g., French (1980) 1987, 1988, and 1989 and also for the entIre penod of [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . In the case of vanance ratIos between MalaysIa and Japan, the values are substantIally greater than 1 except for years 1984 and 1987, and also for the entIre penod [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] , where the vanances of the Japanese market are tremendously larger than those of the MalaysIan market. Overall, the Levene test detected SIgnificant mequality m vanance between the MalaysIan and the Japanese markets only after 1986. Table 4 shows the results of the regressIOn analysIs on the end-of-theweek performance of developed markets and the begmmng-of-the-week performance of the MalaysIan (KLSE) market, wIth KLSE as the dependent vanable. Significant linear relatIOnshIp between the us (NYSE) market and the KLSE can be seen m 1984, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990 and for the entIre penod 1983-1990, as The results of the regressIOn analYSIS somewhat remforce the belief that there IS a relatIonshIp between the end-of-the-week performance of the NYSE, and to the lesser degree the TSE, and the begmnmg-of-the-week performance of the KLSE. In the case of the relatIOnshIp between NYSE and KLSE, the relatIonshIp was more SIgnificant after 1986. In the case of the TSE and KLSE, the relatIOnshIp was not qUIte conSIstent from year to year. Table 5 shows the correlatIon coefficIents between the begmmng-of-theweek performance of the KLSE and the end-of-the-week performances of the NYSE and also the TSE. With the exceptIon of years 1983, 1985 and 1986 , the correlatIOn coefficIents between NYSE and KLSE were hIghly SIgnificant. The hIghest correlatIOn was 0.6861, m year 1989. The correlatIOns between KLSE and TSE were SIgnificant m years 1983, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1990 , and for the entIre penod [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . The correlatIOns between KLSE and NYSE were very SIgnificant after 1986, but not equally SIgnificant between KLSE and TSE. Table 6 shows the Z-values for SIgnificant difference of the correlatIOn coefficIents among sub-penods between the KLSE and also HKSE and the NYSE and the TSE. In general, the correlatIOn coeffiCIents between sub-penods were SIgnificantly different at the 5 percent level. In fact, the hIgh Z-values also mdicate that the differences are SIgnificant at the 1 percent level. These results mdicate that, overall, the correlatIOn coefficIents are not qUIte stable from one sub-penod to another. Table 7 shows the results of the Granger test for causality. For the entIre penod [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] , the NYSE seems to mfluence the KLSE, but not VIce-versa . Lookmg closer at the results for the sub-penods, the us mfluence on the MalaysIan market was qUIte SIgnificant m years 1984 , and hIghly SIgnificant m years 1989 . The Japanese market mfluence on the MalaysIan market was SIgnificant m 1988, and qUIte SIgnificant for the enure penod [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . For other sub-penods, the mfluence was not that SIgnificant. Interestmgly, the results do mdicate hIgh mfluence of KLSE on the Japanese market, espeCIally for years 1983, 1987 and for the entIre penod [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . It IS not that easy to explam thIS phenomenon because studies such as Jeon and von Furstenberg (1990) did mdicate greater mdependence of Tokyo market from other stock markets, espeCIally smce the crash of October 1987 However, one should not forget that MalaysIa IS a country where many bIg Japanese companIes are domg busmess, and many of these compames are listed on the KLSE. Therefore, It IS not that strange that events m MalaysIa do effect the perfonnance m the Tokyo market. 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1983-90 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION
For the MalaysIan market, almost all years showed negauve mean return, WhICh means that the average return on Monday IS negauve. On the other hand, the us market showed posiuve mean return for almost all penods, WhICh means the average return on Fnday IS pOSIuve. These results are qUIte conSIstent WIth the results of the day-of-the-week or weekend effect studies on the MalaysIan or the US markets. In the case of the Japanese market, the SIgns of the mean return are mIxed. The standard deVIatIOns of the MalaysIan market are relatively larger than those of the us market. The Japanese market exhibIted a wIde fluctuatIOn m Its standard deVIatIOns. The vanance ratios between MalaysIa and the us are substantially greater than 1. ThIS Implies that the returns on the MalaysIan market are more volatile compared to the returns on the us market. However, the Levene test detected sIgnificant mequality m vanance only m 3 out of 8 years, and also for the entire penod [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . In the case of vanance ratIOs between MalaYSIa and Japan, the values are substantially greater than 1 except for 2 out of 8 years, and also for the entire penod [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . Overall, the Levene test detected sIgnificant mequality m vanance between the MalaysIan and the Japanese markets only after 1986. ThIS mequality m vanance Implies that these markets are not always m tandem m tenns of theIr volatility In other words, a sIgnificant change or event m the advanced market will not necessarily or always be reflected m the smaller market.
The results of the regressIOn analYSIS, WIth MalaySIa as the dependent varIable, show some sIgnificant relatIOnshIp between NYSE and KLSE. As shown by the Granger causality test, the um-lateral mfluence of the NYSE on the KLSE was qUIte sIgnificant, especIally smce 1987.
The relatIOnshIp between TSE and KLSE was relatively less sIgnificant compared to the relatIOnsmp between NYSE and KLSE. However, the results of the Granger causality test show some bI-lateral causal relationshIps between TSE and KLSE, wIth KLSE exerted more mfluence on the TSE for some years.
The results of the regressIOn analysIs and Granger causality test somewhat remforce the belief that the end-of-the-week perfonnances of the us market, and to the lesser degree the Japanese market, do mfluence the begmmng-ofthe-week perfonnance of the MalaysIan market. In the case of the us market, the mfluence was more pronounced after 1986. In the case of the Japanese market, the mfluence was not qUIte consIstent from year to year. These results do mdicate some validity m the claIm that the perfonnance of a major market does mfluence the perfonnance of a smaller and emergmg market. However, the degrees of mfluence are not qUIte stable from one sub-penod to another.
We show from the results of all the tests perfonned, that mdeed the Issue of causal relatIOnshIp between developed markets and emergmg market, IS still qUIte far from bemg fully resolved. The Idea of predictmg what will happen next m an emergmg market based on what had happened m the developed markets does not seem to be totally acceptable due to changmg or mconsIstent relatIOnshIp between these markets. The mconsIstent correlatIOns found m thIS study can at least substantIates those studies on mternatIOnal diversification, such as that of Maldonado and Saunders (1981) , WhICh questIOn the validity of the potentIal gaIn hypothesIs of the mternatIOnal diversIficatIOn.
